As the word “optics” was understood from antiquity into and beyond the early modern period, it did not mean simply the physics and geometry of light, but meant the “theory of vision” and included what we should now call physiological and psychological aspects. From antiquity, these aspects were subject to geometrical analysis. Accordingly, the geometry of visual experience has long been an object of investigation. This chapter examines accounts of size and distance perception in antiquity (Euclid and Ptolemy) and the (...) Middle Ages (Ibn al-Haytham), before turning to "natural geometry" in Kepler and Descartes. It finds a purely mechanical realization of natural geometry in Descartes (primarily in his L'Homme, 1664), in which he conceives states of the visual system as varying in accordance with distance, much as his geometrical compasses vary their spatial relations in accordance with geometrical proportions. This reading challenges the notion that a two-dimensional sensation (without three-dimensional phenomenality) was universally accepted prior to the nineteenth century by positing a direct psychophysiological account of the experience of distance in Descartes. It thereby challenges the interpretations of Descartes on natural geometry of George Berkeley, Nancy Maull, Margaret Wilson, Erwin Panofsky, and Jonathan Crary. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski is most commonly known as the teacher of great philosophers and the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As a philosopher however, he is primarily remembered for his famous comparison of the contents and objects of various kinds of representations, a comparison that remains enshrined in European thought.In fact, he attained important results in many other branches of philosophy as well. For instance, in ontology, he laid the foundations for the modern theory of formal structure of objects, and he (...) introduced the theoretically fruitful pair of terms, action-product. In epistemology, he developed a profound analysis of the notion and criteria of truth; and he provided a forceful account of the errors underlying relativist theories of truth. In methodology, he drew an explicit distinction between the processes of discovering, systematising, and grounding in science, and he offered accurate descriptions of the nature of psychology and other humanities. In logic, he offered decisive arguments on behalf of the idiogenetic conception of judgement, and he improved the traditional typology of adjectives.These achievements are of significance that is not only historical. Kazimierz Twardowski's work, formulated in plain, precise language, are instructive and inspiring for contemporary students of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the different views of the founders of descriptive psychology in the 19th century about the meaning and purpose of this discipline and sketch a new plan for connecting descriptive psychology with the language-critical tradition of analytic philosophy. I will show that the goals Hermann Lotze, Franz Brentano, and Wilhelm Dilthey set for descriptive psychology were too lofty for different reasons. The common problem they faced was how to reconcile the ideal of autonomous philosophical knowledge with (...) the empirical relevance that descriptive psychology should have. Faced with this dilemma, I outline a new plan to conceive of descriptive psychology as a critical project aimed at overcoming the obstacles that language places in the way of our knowledge of mental phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper we address the question how children come to understand normativity through simple forms of social interaction. A recent line of research suggests that even very young children can understand social norms quite independently of any moral context. We focus on a methodological procedure developed by Rakoczy et al., Developmental Psychology, 44, 875–881, that measures children’s protest behaviour when a pre-established constitutive rule has been violated. Children seem to protest when they realize that rule violations are not allowed (...) or should not have happened. We point out that there is more than one possible explanation for children’s reactions in these studies. They could be due to disobeying an authority, an inability to follow a rule, or the violation of an empirical expectation due to the mismatch between statement and action. We thus question whether it would still count as an indicator for normative understanding if children responded to aspects of the game other than the violation of a constitutive rule and conclude that the protesting behavior, when taken in isolation, does not suffice as evidence for normative understanding. (shrink)

IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...) Guide His Actions?Martina HERRMANN: Competence, Options, and RelationsWeitere Abhandlungen/Further ArticlesEduardo FERMANDOIS: Kommunikation ohne Sprache? Zu Davidsons später SprachphilosophieGuido IMAGUIRE: Die Form der Externalität in Russells An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry und die Ursprünge seiner RelationstheorieBuch-Symposium/Book-SymposiumJohn BICKLE: Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New WaveAnsgar BECKERMANN: Physicalism and New Wave ReductionismJ. Christopher MALONEY: Reservations about New Wave ReductionAchim STEPHAN: How to Lose the Mind-Body ProblemJohn BICKLE: New Wave Metascience. Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and StephanBuchnotizen/Critical NotesEingesandte Bücher/Books Received. (shrink)

Philosophie nach Georg Meggle zeichnet sich aus durch kommunikative Offenheit, durch begriffliche Unbestechlichkeit und durch ihr Engagement in der Welt. Die Beiträge in diesem Band orientieren sich an diesem Philosophieverständnis und sind aus Anlass eines Symposiums zu Ehren von Georg Meggle als Originalbeiträge geschrieben worden. Der Band verbindet die theoretischen und praktischen Aspekte der analytischen Philosophie: So sind die Essays zur Hälfte der theoretischen, meist sprach-analytischen, zur Hälfte der praktischen, meist praktisch-politischen Philosophie zuzuordnen. Die Texte vereint das Ideal des Strebens (...) nach begrifflicher Klarheit und welthaltiger Relevanz, nach Dialog. Sie beschreiten neue Wege der analytischen Philosophie und weisen somit den Weg in die Zukunft der Philosophie als gesellschaftlich relevanter Disziplin. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von: Franz von Kutschera, Peter Singer, Wolfgang Lenzen, Wolfgang Spohn, Reinhard Merkel, Rainer Hegselmann, Peter Rohs und Georg Meggle. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano¿s Critique of Kant¿s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano Weitere Artikel/Further Articles Christian Damböck: Wilhelm Diltheys empirische (...) Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen Philosophie Bernd Prien: Socially Constituted Actions and Objects Daniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of Coherentism Jon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose¿s Contextualism Andre Abath: Brewer¿s Switching Argument Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Amadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-Making Stefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?¿Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation Phenomena Peter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Emotions Besprechungsaufsatz/Review Essay Christopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge¿s Theory of Perception Diskussion/Discussion Georg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan¿s Argument Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

... Studien-26 THEMES IN MY PHILOSOPHICAL WORK Terry HORGAN University of Memphis This paper is an overview of my philosophical work. ...

Grazer Philosophische Studien is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on philosophical problems in every area, especially articles related to the analytic tradition.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik ¿ Philipp Frank und Abel Rey Nicola Mössner: Testimoniale Akte neu definiert ¿ ein zentrales Problem des Zeugnisses Anderer Simon Dierig: (...) Goldmans Scheunen-Beispiel und das Problem der Vereinbarkeit von Externalismus und Selbstkenntnis Diskussionen/Discussions Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Besprechungen/Review Essays Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Eingelangte Bücher/Books Received. (shrink)

Brentano’s use of the expression ‘intentional inexistence’ poses a considerable terminological problem. This is due not only to the expressions ‘intentional’ and ‘inexistence’ contained in it. The biggest hurdle is the liberal use of the expression ‘object’, which is encouraged by Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistent (or immanent) objects. Carlo Ierna tries to meet this problem with a strategy that allows to hold on to the notion of intentional inexistence without accepting immanent objects. The originality of his interpretation lies, as (...) I will show in my commentary, in the fact that it tries to achieve its goal by terminological measures alone. Following the same line, I will argue that Brentano’s self-correction, made in the second edition of his Psychology, can also be interpreted in this context as a terminological move. (shrink)

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. (...) Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis. (shrink)

The investigation of the mind has been one of the major concerns of our philosophical tradition and is still a dominant subject in modern philosophy and science. Many philosophers in the scientific tradition want to solve the "puzzles of the mind," but believe the "puzzles" to be puzzles of the brain. So, whilst the former think of the mental as something of its own kind, the latter deny that philosophy of mind has to do with anything else but the brain. (...) Philosophers also believe that reduction is the way to go. Maybe the mental is brain-dependent and hence reducible to the physical, in some way. This volume collects contributions that comprise each view point, and incorporates articles by William Bechtel, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim, Jolle Proust, and Patrick Suppes. (shrink)

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. (...) Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis. (shrink)

The present essay deals with the fabrication of the imperial genealogy of the Southern Tang state. A means of linking the Southern Tang founder Li Bian to the Tang, it helped establish Southern Tang claims to the Tang heritage. Though no original fabricated genealogy survives, variant forms have been handed down through a number of texts starting in the early Northern Song period. These are discussed in terms of their plausibility, marking the Jiang- nan lu by Xu Xuan as the (...) officially accepted description and the Zizhi tongjian version as the most “believable” of all fake Southern Tang genealogies. (shrink)

We develop a criterion for telling when integrating two pieces of information, e.g. two pictures or statements requires an understanding of perspective. Problems that require such an understanding are perspective problems. With this criterion we can show that understanding false beliefs vis-à-vis reality pose a perspective problem, so does understanding spatial descriptions given from different viewing points (a classical example of what is commonly seen as a problem of perspective) and individuating objects with different sortals (naming objects). We use the (...) result that understanding false belief as well as alternative naming of objects are both perspective problems to explain the otherwise inexplicable developmental finding that children master these two tasks at about the same time, around the age of 4 years. (shrink)

Kutschera's criticism of an objectivist theory of mind is shown to rest on a premise which an objectivist need not accept, namely, that there is a deep metaphysical distinction between the physical and the psychological domain. This premise can be rejected on naturalistic grounds. Referring to the work of Rosenthal, Dennett and Davidson, it is argued that less metaphysically loaded explanations can be given of what is subjective about the mind.

We develop a new theory of the cognitive changes around 4 years of age by trying to explain why understanding of false belief and of alternative naming emerge at this age. We make use of the notion of discourse referents as it is used in File Change Semantics, one of the early forms of the more widely known Discourse Representation Theory. The assumed cognitive change exists in how children can link DRs in their mind to external referents. The younger children (...) check whether the conditions for a DR match the conditions of an external entity. The older children, in addition, have an explicit understanding of reference in virtue of making explicit identity assertions. This involves the metarepresentational ability of representing that different DRs represent the same external referent, which — we argue — is required for alternative naming and for the false belief task. (shrink)

Some observers regard South Africa as one of the most violent, lawless and morally depraved societies in the world. Several other countries around the world can be shown to be similarly afflicted. In South Africa's case, this condition might be because of political transformation, particularly the lingering effects of the struggle against past injustices inflicted on sections of the population. The social instability has been exacerbated by an influx of migrants and a resultant increase in diversity. One way of attempting (...) to assuage this situation is to harness the school subject known as 'citizenship education' for guiding the upcoming generations into committing to a new moral compass, that is, awareness or consciousness with a conscience, and to an accompanying new social contract. Finding a rationale for such a moral compass and social contract that all the citizens of South Africa and of other similarly stricken countries would be prepared to commit to is a daunting task because people tend to be subjective in reflecting about their personal and group views, particularly about their religious beliefs and convictions. Closer examination reveals, however, that despite all the diversity, differences and conflict prevalent in societies, people are potentially able to share a set of basic values that arguably could form the core of the sought-for moral compass. Citizenship education could be functional in bringing home to the next generation the notion of henceforth living in accordance with the precepts of such a moral compass and social contract. (shrink)

Academics and/or scholars increasingly feel that their academic voice (combined or individual) has been squelched by the demands of performativity in its various guises, and resultantly, that they have been caught up in a process of steady disempowerment. Rather, it should be their right to be free to use their positions in the pursuit of scholarship as their conscience and their expert knowledge of their subject dictate. Academics should be free to question for themselves the boundaries of their limitations, and (...) not have these i mposedon them by the state or government bureaucracy. In order to help empower academics to regain their academic voice and identity, this article transposes six of the philosophical ideas of Belgian philosopher Rudi Visker to the world of academia. It explores the possibilities of using these ideas as instruments for the promotion and maintenance of academic freedom. Key concepts: academic freedom, managerialism, institutions of higher learning, Rudi Visker. (shrink)

This article is about developments that are on the rise in response to the global hegemony of the neoliberal approach to life in general and education in particular. After an outline of what neoliberalism entails and how it has impacted education, the discussion moves on to an outline of several of these new developments that are seemingly unrelated but at the deepest level seem to be critical of neoliberalism and its views about education. This is followed by a critical appraisal (...) of these new developments. The appraisal, executed along the guidelines of the social space and ethical function theory, shows that these new developments, although they suggest a number of important corrections regarding neoliberalism and its views on education, are in themselves one-sided and narrow. It is nevertheless important for educators and educationists to take account of such new developments that are in the process of changing our view of the world. (shrink)

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006 ). We (...) argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994 ), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. (shrink)